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A MURKY DOCTRINE GETS A LITTLE 
PUSHBACK: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S 
REBUFF OF GUILTY PLEAS IN UNITED 
STATES v. FISHER 
Abstract: On April 1, 2013, in United States v. Fisher, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s guilty plea post-sentencing 
because of an officer’s impermissible conduct during the preceding investiga-
tion. In doing so, the court expanded on the “voluntariness” prerequisite out-
lined in the seminal 1970 U.S. Supreme Court case of Brady v. United States 
that governs the guilty plea process in federal court. This Comment argues that 
this was a prudent expansion given the troubling nature of guilty pleas in gen-
eral. This Comment outlines the basic contours of guilty pleas in the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system and finds that the protection extended by the Fourth Circuit in 
Fisher is needed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Choosing to plead guilty in open court is a solemn and grave decision.1 
Defendants who choose to do so subject themselves to the state’s full arsenal 
of punitive power and strip themselves of many core constitutional rights.2 
Yet, the government achieves most of its convictions in just this way.3 More-
over, not only are most convictions achieved through guilty pleas, the plea 
process requires defendants to relinquish much of their right to appeal, there-
by exacerbating the enormity of such a decision.4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (noting that “a guilty plea is a grave and 
solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment has long been recognized”). 
 2 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–29 (2002) (stating that “[w]hen a defendant pleads 
guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional 
guarantees”). 
 3 See John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary 
Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV 88, 89 (1977) (stating that “it is estimated that 
between eight-five to ninety-five percent of all criminal convictions result from guilty pleas”); see 
also Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 311 (1975) (contextualizing the high rate of guilty pleas in criminal pro-
ceedings by statistical analysis, and concluding that a significant percentage—perhaps even one 
third—of defendants who plead guilty would have been acquitted at trial); Kirke D. Weaver, A 
Change of Heart or a Change of Law? Withdrawing a Guilty Plea Under Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 32(e), 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 273, 273 (2002) (noting the near ubiquitous 
use of plea bargaining to secure convictions). 
 4 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29–30 (1974) (demonstrating the profundity of a 
guilty plea by stating that a defendant may not claim deprivation of his constitutional rights after 
he has pled guilty, but instead may only challenge the plea itself); United States v. Moussaoui, 591 
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Because of the consequences and gravity of such a potentially irreversi-
ble choice, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1970, in Brady v. United States, held 
that defendants wishing to plead guilty must do so intelligently, knowingly, 
and voluntarily.5 The Brady Court further elucidated the voluntariness stand-
ard: 
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware . . . must stand unless 
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harass-
ment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper 
as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. 
bribes).6 
In 2013, in United States v. Fisher, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit expanded on the “misrepresentation” aspect of this voluntari-
ness standard.7 Extending the Court’s reasoning in Brady, the majority found 
that an officer’s misconduct during an investigation was so egregious as to 
render the defendant’s subsequent guilty plea involuntary—even though the 
defendant never actually claimed to be innocent.8 
Part I of this Comment provides the basic framework of the criminal 
pleading process, specifically the mechanisms by which guilty pleas are 
withdrawn or vacated, and further outlines the procedural posture of Fisher.9 
Part II analyzes the court’s reasoning in Fisher, particularly its extension of 
Brady and its progressive conception of legal voluntariness.10 Finally, Part III 
argues that this extension is prudent and necessary given the extremely high 
rate at which prosecutors secure convictions by consent.11 Part III concludes 
that in our system of justice, preventing the harms of government abuse and 
wrongful conviction should take precedence over promoting judicial and 
prosecutorial economy.12 
                                                                                                                           
F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010) (limiting attacks on judgments subsequent to guilty pleas to jurisdic-
tional defects). 
 5 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. See generally Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the 
Supreme Court, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757 (1988) (providing an extensive history of the Supreme 
Court’s guilty plea jurisprudence). 
 6 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (emphasis added) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 
572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 
 7 See United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 465, 469 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 8 See id. at 467, 469. 
 9 See infra notes 13–49 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 50–69 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 70–88 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 74–88 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE UNDOING OF A GUILTY PLEA IN FEDERAL COURT 
A. The High Standard of Post-Sentence Plea Withdrawal 
A guilty plea is essentially a bargain struck between a defendant and the 
government.13 The bargain allows the defendant to consent to his own con-
viction in exchange for a lesser sentence, and allows the government to pre-
serve prosecutorial and judicial resources.14 Given the government’s goal of 
efficiency, the government depends on the finality of a guilty plea: resources 
are not preserved if a defendant may simply appeal his conviction in the hope 
of an acquittal.15 
To guarantee finality, defendants waive—both explicitly and implicit-
ly—many of their core constitutional rights.16 Explicitly, defendants waive 
their right to a jury trial, their right not to incriminate themselves, and their 
right to confront their accusers.17 Implicitly, defendants waive almost all 
means to appeal their own conviction, thereby establishing the permanence of 
their decision.18 
This finality, however, is established only once a sentence is imposed.19 
Alternatively, before sentencing, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure allows for a more liberal process of plea withdrawal.20 This lenien-
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 (explaining the mutual benefits enjoyed by defendants and the 
state in the plea bargaining process). This “bargaining” aspect of the plea process is governed by 
contract law principles, which illuminates the relevance of reliance and finality. See Brian R. Ship-
ley & Kimberly A. Cleaveland, Guilty Pleas, 87 GEO. L. J. 1433, 1435–38 (1999) (extrapolating 
contract law principles in the guilty plea context); Weaver, supra note 3, at 290–91 (noting that 
contract law is “deeply embedded in the jurisprudence surrounding plea agreements”).  
 14 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; Alexandra Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains 
and Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 874–75 (2010). 
 15 See Augustine V. Cheng, Appellate Review of Double Jeopardy Claims in the Guilty Plea 
Process, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 986–87 (1988) (articulating the state’s interest in the guilty 
plea process as reasoned in the famous Brady trilogy—a series of cases in which the Supreme 
Court constitutionally validated and set basic parameters for the guilty plea process in criminal 
trials). 
 16 Shipley & Cleaveland, supra note 13, at 1442 (outlining the basic consequences of a guilty 
plea). 
 17 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself[.]”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury[.]”); id. (“In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 18 See Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 279; Shipley & Cleaveland, supra note 13, at 1442. 
 19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  
 20 See id.; 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL, POST-SENTENCE STANDARD, § 48:4 (2013). If a 
defendant wishes to withdraw his plea before the court accepts it, the defendant may do so freely. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. If the court has accepted the plea but has not imposed a sentence, the defend-
ant may request permission to withdraw his plea. See id.; Weaver, supra note 3, at 274–75. Rule 11 
allows for this withdrawal if the court either rejects the plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(5), or if 
the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11; Weaver, supra note 3, at 274–75. To determine whether a “fair and just” reason exists, the 
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cy ends after sentencing, as Rule 11 establishes that after a court imposes a 
sentence, “the defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty . . . and the plea 
may be set aside only on direct appeal or collateral attack.”21 
Thus, to withdraw a guilty plea after a sentence is imposed, the only av-
enue under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is to attack the validity 
of the plea itself.22 Given the extensive colloquy mandated by Rule 11—
which has the effect of making the pleas extremely thorough and is designed 
to unequivocally establish a defendant’s guilt and competence—attacking the 
validity of the plea itself is exceedingly difficult.23  
Following the Court’s decision in Brady—where the Court explicitly in-
terpreted the Due Process Clause to require that guilty pleas be made volun-
tarily, intelligently, and knowingly—it is increasingly more common for de-
fendants to challenge their pleas as violating these basic requirements.24 
Moreover, prisoners’ challenges to their pleas have been diverse and have 
expanded on the original conceptions established by the Court’s holding in 
Brady.25 For example, prisoners have successfully challenged the validity of 
their guilty pleas in cases where there was a complete constitutional bar on 
the conviction of the offense,26 where the court or the prosecutor improperly 
                                                                                                                           
court will often balance four factors: 1) whether the defendant established a fair and just reason; 2) 
whether the defendant declares his own innocence; 3) the time between the guilty plea and the 
motion; and 4) any potential prejudice to the government. Weaver, supra note 3, at 274–75. 
 21 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Prior to 1983, Rule 32 allowed for the withdrawal of a guilty plea after 
sentencing to correct a “manifest injustice.” See 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 20, 
at § 48:3. In 1983, an amendment to Rule 32 struck the right to withdraw, but noted that a plea can 
be set aside “only on direct appeal or by motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.” Id. The current Rule 
11 adopts much of this language but drops specific reference to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. 
V 2012). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 20, at § 48:3.  
 22 See Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 279 (“When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all non-
jurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to entry of the plea [and] has no non-
jurisdictional ground upon which to attack that judgment except the inadequacy of the plea.” 
(quoting United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644–45 (4th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). The statutory mechanism that allows for such a withdrawal is 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which 
allows prisoners in federal prisons to file motions challenging the legality of their sentences. See 
28 U.S.C. § 2255; 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 20, at § 48:3. 
 23 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. The term “colloquy” in the legal context references a formal and 
procedural conversation, often having legal effect. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining “colloquy”).  
 24 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; see infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 26–29 (providing examples of such challenges). 
 26 E.g., Brooks v. United States, 424 F.2d 426, 426 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that a violation of 
the constitutional right against self-incrimination is a full defense to a guilty plea). Another inter-
esting example of such a bar is the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy. See generally 
Cheng, supra note 15 (discussing the categorical bar on accepting guilty pleas that violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause). 
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induced the plea,27 where the sentence was not authorized by law,28 or where 
a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel.29  
In Brady, however, the Court also referenced the potential involuntari-
ness—and thus invalidity—of guilty pleas that are a result of impermissible 
state conduct.30 Although the Court ultimately upheld the defendants’ guilty 
pleas in Brady, the Court still recognized the potential risk that the govern-
ment might abuse the plea-bargaining process and the government isolation 
the abuse would afford thereunder.31 
B. Extraordinary Circumstances: United States v. Fisher 
In 2008, Cortez Fisher pled guilty to one count of possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon.32 Fisher was sentenced to ten years in prison.33 The principal officer 
involved in Fisher’s investigation was Mark Lunsford, a Baltimore City Drug 
Enforcement Agency Task Officer.34 
In the course of Lunsford’s investigation, he applied for a search warrant 
to search Fisher’s residence and vehicle.35 To support this application, Luns-
ford submitted a sworn affidavit—which served as the sole basis for the ap-
plication—in which he averred that a confidential informant had told him that 
Fisher distributed drugs from his apartment and possessed a gun.36 Lunsford 
further averred that the informant provided him with a physical description of 
                                                                                                                           
 27 E.g., United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183, 1188–89 (3d Cir. 1974) (overruling the 
trial court’s denial of a hearing for a defendant that was seeking to withdraw his plea based on the 
false promises he received during the pleading process, and holding that trial courts should place 
defendants under oath before accepting guilty pleas). 
 28 E.g., Lanier v. State, 635 So. 2d 813, 819 (Miss. Ct. App. 1994) (invalidating a guilty plea 
“contract” for life in prison without parole before the specific sentence imposed for murder was 
not authorized by the Mississippi legislature). 
 29 E.g., United States v. Bennett, 716 F. Supp. 1137, 1145–47 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (accepting 
defense attorneys’ claims of their own ineffective assistance of counsel due to their inability to 
predict the probation office’s sentencing guideline, and consequently accepting applications for 
plea withdrawal). 
 30 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (holding that informed and voluntary guilty please must stand un-
less they are induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises that have no proper 
relationship to the prosecutor’s business). 
 31 See id. 
 32 Fisher, 711 F.3d at 463 (noting that the defendant was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841 
(2006 & Supp. V 2012) for his cocaine offense and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) for his firearm 
offense). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 462. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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Fisher, his address, and the make and model of Fisher’s car, and that this in-
formant confirmed Fisher’s identity when shown his photograph.37 
Based on this affidavit, Lunsford obtained a warrant and executed it on 
October 29, 2007.38 During this search, detectives found crack cocaine and a 
loaded handgun; these findings were the foundation for the charges to which 
Fisher later pled guilty and received a decade in federal prison.39 
The problem, however, was that the confidential informant that Luns-
ford referenced in his affidavit had no relation to Lunsford’s case against 
Fisher.40 In reality, the “informant” that Lunsford refers to never identified 
Fisher, never alleged that Fisher was breaking any law, and never described 
Fisher.41 Instead, Lunsford intentionally fabricated the source of the infor-
mation that the court ultimately relied on in its decision to grant the warrant 
to search Fisher’s home.42 Lunsford provided this false information in order 
to split the reward money that the “informant” would receive for “helping” 
the police arrest Fisher.43 Lunsford later pled guilty to charges related to this 
behavior, doing so over a year after Fisher had begun his ten-year sentence.44 
Based on Lunsford’s misconduct, Fisher filed a motion to vacate his 
guilty plea.45 The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland—while 
noting that Fisher may have been deprived of a potentially successful motion 
to suppress—denied Fisher’s motion because Fisher pled guilty to the crime 
and the prosecution did not breach any obligation owed to Fisher.46 Fisher 
appealed, arguing that his plea was invalid under both Brady v. United States 
and another landmark 1970 U.S. Supreme Court case, Brady v. Maryland.47 
In Fisher, the Fourth Circuit found that Detective Lunsford’s miscon-
duct was egregious enough to warrant vacating Fisher’s plea under Brady.48 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. at 462–63. 
 38 Id. at 463.  
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. Lunsford claimed that another informant existed, who was not mentioned in the affida-
vit, that actually provided this information to Lunsford. Id. 
 41 Id. at 468. Lunsford later identified a different person as the “real informant,” but never 
actually claimed that this “real informant” provided all the information in the affidavit. Id. 
 42 See id. at 468–69. 
 43 See id. at 463. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 463–64; Motion to Alter or Amend Order, United States v. Fisher, No. 1:07-CR-
00518 (D. Md. July 28, 2010), ECF No. 18.  
 46 United States v. Fisher, No. 1:07-CR-00518, 2010 WL 3000005, at *1 (D. Md. July 28, 
2010), rev’d, 711 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 2013). A motion to suppress is a motion to exclude evidence 
from entering a trial because of some defect either in the evidence itself or in the manner in which 
the evidence was obtained. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. 
 47 Fisher, 711 F.3d at 464. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1970) (holding that 
the suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution violates the Due Process Clause). 
 48 Fisher, 711 F.3d at 465. 
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The district court decision was therefore reversed, and the case was remanded 
for further proceedings.49 
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S EXPANSION OF VOLUNTARINESS UNDER BRADY 
In 2013, in United States v. Fisher, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that a defendant’s guilty plea may be vacated post-
sentencing if a government officer behaved egregiously during the course of 
the defendant’s investigation.50 To reach this conclusion the court relied on 
the 1970 U.S. Supreme Court decision Brady v. United States, where the 
Court established the constitutionality—and certain parameters—of the crim-
inal pleading process.51 Specifically, the Fisher court expanded the Brady 
Court’s holding that guilty pleas must be voluntary but that “absent misrepre-
sentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents,” guilty pleas must 
stand.52 
The court’s expansion in Fisher relies upon the nexus between the vol-
untariness of a defendant’s guilty plea and the “impermissible conduct” by 
government agents.53 Citing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit’s 2006 decision Ferrara v. United States, the Fourth Circuit distilled this 
nexus into a two-part test to determine if impermissible government conduct 
rendered a plea involuntary.54 First, a defendant must show “some egregious-
ly impermissible conduct (say, threats, blatant misrepresentations, or unto-
ward blandishments by government agents) antedated the entry of his plea.”55 
Second, a defendant must show that “the misconduct influenced his decision 
to plead guilty or, put another way, that it was material to that choice.”56 
Applying its two-part test to the facts before it, the Fisher court con-
cluded that Lunsford’s affirmative misrepresentations—in this case, blatant 
lies—in his affidavit amounted to egregiously impermissible conduct.57 Fur-
ther, the court held that this misconduct, having led to obtaining incriminating 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id. at 462. 
 50 United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 469 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 51 Id. See generally Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (establishing the analytical 
framework of modern pleading procedures). In the 1970 U.S. Supreme Court decision Brady v. 
United States, a defendant pled guilty to kidnapping charges in order to avoid a potential death 
sentence that could result from a jury trial. 397 U.S. at 743–44. The defendant later argued that his 
guilty plea was not valid because—fearing for his life—he was compelled to forgo his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. Id. The Court disagreed. Id. at 745. 
 52 Brady, 397 U.S. at 757; see Fisher, 711 F.3d at 464–65 (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 757). 
 53 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755; Fisher, 711 F.3d at 466, 469; see also Ferrara v. United States, 
456 F.3d 278, 293 (1st Cir. 2006) (elucidating critical review of governmental behavior in the 
guilty plea context). 
 54 Fisher, 711 F.3d at 465 (quoting Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290). 
 55 Id. (quoting Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56 Id. (quoting Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57 Id. at 467. 
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evidence, influenced Fisher’s decision to plead guilty.58 Accordingly, the 
court set aside Fisher’s guilty plea as involuntary and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.59 
In so holding, the Fourth Circuit used a state-centered approach to vol-
untariness—unlike other courts that utilize a defendant-centered approach—
that declined to focus on prosecutorial behavior and exculpatory evidence.60 
Rather than assessing the prosecutor’s conduct in a vacuum, the Fisher court 
diminished the distinction between different government actors, particularly, 
the investigating officer and the prosecutor.61 Instead, the court attributed the 
investigating officer’s egregious behavior to the prosecution as a whole, even 
though the prosecutor, in fact, disclosed the officer’s behavior as soon as it 
became known.62 Accordingly, the plea was vacated despite the absence any 
evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.63 
Further, the court found the question of Fisher’s innocence, or at least 
Fisher’s claim of innocence, to be substantially irrelevant.64 Instead of look-
ing to whether the prosecution misled the defendant or suppressed exculpato-
ry evidence, the court sidestepped the issue of innocence and focused almost 
exclusively on Lunsford’s conduct.65 
This unprecedented rebuff of governmental action and expansion of the 
voluntariness standard makes for a simpler—though still difficult—process 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. at 469. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Compare Fisher, 711 F.3d at 469–70 (state-centered approach), with United States v. Ruiz, 
536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (defendant-centered approach focusing on innocence), and Matthew v. 
Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2000) (defendant-centered approach also focusing on defend-
ant’s factual guilt). 
 61 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 466; id. at 476 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
 62 Id. at 466 (majority opinion); id. at 476 (Agee, J., dissenting). The dissent, in the traditional 
manner, anchors its analysis in an inquiry into potential prosecutorial conduct prior to trial—an 
analysis that has been popular in other courts. See id. at 471–72. Accordingly, its citations focus 
almost exclusively on the absence of some any of prosecutorial malfeasance. See id. The dissent 
reasons that the imputation of police misconduct to the prosecution in the pleading context is a 
novel development. See id. 
 63 See id. at 476 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
 64 Id. at 467 (majority opinion). The dissent emphatically notes that the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit’s 2006 decision Ferrara v. United States, a major pillar of support for the 
majority’s decision, involved the suppression of exculpatory evidence that went directly to the 
defendant’s innocence. Id. at 476 (Agee, J., dissenting); Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 280 (noting the ex-
culpatory nature of withheld evidence in that case). This highlights a fundamental difference in the 
court’s reasoning in Fisher and the authority it relied upon: that in Fisher the withdrawal of a 
guilty plea may be premised purely on state action regardless of the question of whether that state 
action potentially incorrectly inculpated the defendant. See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 476 (Agee, J., dis-
senting). This reflects a shift from a defendant-centered approach to a state-centered approach. See 
id. at 469 (majority opinion); id. at 476 (Agee, J., dissenting); see also Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 280 
(focusing on state action and noting the court’s role in scrupulously holding the government to 
high standards in the pleading context). 
 65 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 466–67, 469–470 (majority opinion). 
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for defendants seeking to withdraw guilty pleas in the wake of government 
misconduct.66 Put another way, the Fourth Circuit scrutinized the government 
action more extensively, thus expanding upon the Brady Court’s analysis.67 
Indeed, the Fisher court indicated that its decision is intended to rebuff over-
zealous investigators and to deter egregious police activity.68 As the dissent 
emphatically argued, however, the Fourth Circuit, in expanding the voluntari-
ness concept, is standing without much precedential support.69 
III. AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IN A TROUBLESOME FIELD: THE FOURTH 
CIRCUIT’S ADVANCEMENT OF JUSTICE 
Expanding the concept of legal voluntariness in the guilty plea con-
text—beyond the traditional focus on prosecutorial misconduct and exculpa-
tory evidence—is necessary to critically address the troubling means by 
which most convictions are achieved.70 This expansion will allow courts to 
rebuff impermissible government conduct that, in effect, unduly pressures 
defendants to incriminate themselves and submit to punishment.71 Holding 
otherwise would enable the government to use impermissible means—such 
as utilizing illegally obtained information—to induce guilty pleas.72 Although 
plea bargaining is essential for the criminal justice system to operate efficient-
ly, expanding the voluntariness requirement is necessary to ensure that the 
plea bargaining procedures are fair for defendants.73 
Because it would be impossible to simply abolish the plea bargaining 
process, it is crucial that courts strive to ensure its fairness.74 Whatever pres-
                                                                                                                           
 66 Compare id. at 469 (reasoning that a defendant that could point only to government mis-
conduct—and any direct pressure or any exculpatory evidence—was sufficient to vacate a guilty 
plea), with Mark. S. Rhodes, Relief After Sentencing is Exceptional, in 5 ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 32:43 (2012) (describing the rarity of relief from 
guilty pleas post-sentencing). 
 67 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 469. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. at 478 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
 70 See Becker, supra note 5, at 760 (describing the guilty plea jurisprudence as a “constitu-
tional black hole,” and opining that Supreme Court cases on the issue “move irregularly in differ-
ent directions, like drunks scattering from a bar”); Priscilla Budeiri, Collateral Consequences of 
Guilty Pleas in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 157, 159 (1981) 
(highlighting the troubling nature of the guilty plea process); Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 293–95 
(noting the troubling probability of innocent defendants pleading guilty). 
 71 See United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. (taking a holistic approach to the voluntariness standard to ensure integrity in the 
pleading process); Budeiri, supra note 70, at 162 (highlighting the impossibility of eliminating the 
plea bargaining process). 
 74 See Barkai, supra note 3, at 89–90 (overviewing the importance of judicial oversight of the 
plea bargaining process); Budeiri, supra note 70, at 162 (noting the impossibility of abolishing the 
plea-bargaining process, given both its ubiquitous use and scarce judicial resources). 
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sure the government seeks to put on defendants to plead must be lawful and 
calibrated to respect both the defendant’s constitutional rights and the profun-
dity of the incarcerating—and sometimes killing—of autonomous human 
beings.75 Although this is certainly already the case in theory, the facts before 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in its 2013 United States v. 
Fisher decision demonstrate that there is little actual recourse for defendants 
who plead guilty as a result of impermissible government behavior.76 Even 
though government officials guilty of such conduct may well be punished, 
defendants still remain beholden to calculations made under the false assump-
tion of lawful government activity.77 Indeed, in Fisher, it was the court’s 
oversight that rebuffed impermissible government conduct that, in effect, un-
duly pressured a defendant to incriminate himself.78 Without this judicial 
oversight, the government would have successfully used illegally obtained 
information to pressure an individual to plead to crimes of which he was oth-
erwise likely to be acquitted.79 
Moreover, expanding the voluntariness requirement will help remedy 
the manner in which plea bargaining is currently carried out in weaker cas-
es—that is, those cases where the government’s case is less certain, and the 
defendant’s innocence is more likely.80 Expanding the requirement is vital 
because, in fact, plea bargaining can potentially lead to innocent people 
pleading guilty to avert the risk of more severe punishment.81 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Becker, supra note 5, at 837 (“However, a genuine concern for innocent defendants 
requires that there be at least some scrutiny of the degree of inducement offered for a guilty 
plea.”). Of particular concern, and highlighted in the 1970 U.S. Supreme Court decision Brady v. 
United States, is the possibility of the death sentence. 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970). 
 76 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 474–75 (Agee, J., dissenting). As the dissent emphatically notes, 
and the majority seems to tacitly admit, there is no caselaw directly on point with facts substantial-
ly similar to Fisher. Id.; see also id. at 462 (majority opinion) (referring to the facts of the case as 
“extraordinary”). Thus, it would seem that either the police act perfectly every time they investi-
gate, or that little recourse on these grounds is available. See id. at 474–75 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
Accordingly, although the court under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has the discretion 
to not accept a guilty plea, oversight by way of retroactive correction is rare. Rhodes, supra note 
66, § 32:43. 
 77 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (permitting a defendant to attack the validity of a plea); see also 
United States v. Ferrara, 456 F.3d 278, 293 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that “the petitioner should have 
been able to trust the government to turn square corners”). 
 78 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 469–70. 
 79 See id.at 467; see also Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 295 (analyzing the likelihood of convic-
tion in cases where defendants plead guilty, concluding that substantial number of defendants who 
plead guilty would have been acquitted at trial). 
 80 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 469–70 (demonstrating a procedurally weak case wherein a guilty 
plea was improperly extracted); Barkai, supra note 3, at 89–94 (summarizing the importance and 
efficacy of heightened judicial oversight and inquiry). 
 81 See Budeiri, supra note 70, at 160, 162 (noting that the “mutually beneficial” nature of 
guilty pleas is often unfulfilled, and noting the permanence of the pleading process); Finkelstein, 
supra note 3, at 295 (concluding via statistical analysis that legally innocent people do in fact 
plead guilty and unnecessarily convict themselves); see also Becker, supra note 5, at 779–80 (ana-
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning criminal pleading 
procedures, which assumes the guilt of properly represented and informed 
defendants who plead guilty, exacerbates this problem.82 In reality, however, 
even properly informed and represented defendants, though innocent, may 
nonetheless admit guilt.83 In this way, the Court’s assumption is thus incon-
sistent with the presumption of innocence, as defendants should not be forced 
to gamble with their freedom.84 
This expanded inquiry into the question of “voluntariness” will ensure 
that the government’s actions when it seeks to punish someone will be held to 
the highest standard.85 As the court recognized in Fisher, the current process 
of conviction is unfair and should not be allowed.86 The entirety of the gov-
ernment’s case against an individual is inherently tainted when officials lie 
and manipulate the courts to achieve convictions.87 Expanding the voluntari-
                                                                                                                           
lyzing the concept of “voluntariness” in the context of the external pressure present in the plea 
bargaining process). 
 82 Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (“We would have serious doubts . . . if the encouragement of guilty 
pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by com-
petent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based on 
our expectations . . . that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the defendants’ 
admissions that they committed the crimes with which they are charged.” (emphasis added)). 
 83 See Becker, supra note 5, at 834–37 (outlining general principles underlying an innocent 
person’s decision to plead guilty). The inducements available to a prosecutor seeking to solidify a 
plea are varied and almost limitlessly extensive, even including inducements involving less severe 
treatment of third parties, such as a defendant’s spouse. Id. at 835. Such inducements call very 
much into the question the “voluntariness” of such a decision; further, the inherent fallibility of the 
trial system may not exactly inspire the utmost hope of acquittal in innocent, but unfortunate, 
defendants. Id. at 835–37; see Barkai, supra note 3, at 96–97. 
 84 See Barkai, supra note 3, at 95–96 (explaining the “protectionist” rationale in the pleading 
process, whereby the courts are to protect innocent defendants who might still plead guilty for an 
array of compelling reasons); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea 
Process, 40 HASTINGS L. J. 957, 958 (1989) (illuminating the ambiguity in the guilty plea proce-
dure and confusion practically inherent in the process). 
 85 See Becker, supra note 5, at 841. 
 86 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 469 (summing up the general policy concerns underlying the court’s 
decision to vacate Fisher’s plea); Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 293 (emphasizing the importance of proper 
government behavior). 
 87 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 466. The government cannot claim any prejudice against it if, from 
the moment Detective Lunsford lied in his affidavit, it had no case against Mr. Fisher; one cannot 
lose what one never had. See id. at 468–69; cf. Cheng, supra note 15, at 986–87 (positing that 
when a constitutional bar exists as to a conviction, the government never had a case and, therefore, 
suffers no cognizable harm when a guilty plea is vacated). At the same time, however, the dissent 
correctly observed that precedent does not necessitate an expansion of the voluntariness require-
ment. See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 470–71 (Agee, J., dissenting) (“Indeed while the majority avers that 
its holding is based on Brady v. United States, its application of the ‘material misrepresentation’ 
standard in this case lacks support in any published case from any court.”). Given the current 
abuses in the system, however, this precedent should now be established. See Finkelstein, supra 
note 3, at 311 (“[I]t appears that . . . practices have been used to induce convictions by ‘consent’ in 
a significant number of cases in which the protections of the formal system would have precluded 
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ness requirement beyond prosecutorial misconduct and exculpatory evidence 
will better achieve justice for defendants, discourage improper police behav-
ior, and preserve the public’s faith in the justice system.88 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Fisher is not a mere 
application of existing precedent. It is, as the court admitted, an “extraordi-
nary” set of facts that led to an extraordinary result: the withdrawal of an oth-
erwise valid guilty plea post-sentencing because of impermissible police con-
duct. The Fisher court illuminates and implicates many long-standing strong-
holds of the pleading process: the insulation that the government enjoys 
throughout the pleading process, the difficulty of plea withdrawal, and the 
uncertainty regarding the implications that result from using the guilty plea as 
the primary means of conviction. The Fourth Circuit was right not to simply 
uphold the defendant’s plea and instead take a more critical stance. Particular-
ly, the Fourth Circuit was right to critically address the impermissible behav-
ior on the part of the previously insulated investigating officers—an expan-
sion of the long-established precedent that focused only on prosecutorial mis-
conduct. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit expanded the scope of justice and 
strove to ensure fairness at every level of the criminal procedure process. The 
Fourth Circuit’s criticism and willingness to revise long-established principles 
will help to shed light into what is otherwise a very murky area of the law. 
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a condemnation.”); cf. Barkai, supra note 3, at 145 (arguing for an extension of “accuracy inquir-
ies” to non-felony cases to insure consistently fair pleading processes). 
 88 See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 466, 470 (noting the possible relevance, but ultimate superflous-
ness, of a defendant’s innocence in this context, and emphasizing the importance of public faith in 
the criminal justice system). 
